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In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court determined under the common law of agency[2] that a group of unrecognized
unionizing agents were employees rather than independent contractors.[3] The applied test evaluated ten non-
exhaustive aspects of the employment relationship in question.[4] Factors weighed include the extent of
control; the skill required, the ownership of tools and the place of work; the length of the employment and;
whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer.[5]
While both the National Labor Relations Board and the courts have revisited and re ned the proper application
of the aforementioned factors, the core function of the test has remained the same.[6] Conversely, where the
individual factors of the test have endured without change, overarching principles used in evaluating the
signi cance of each factor have transformed.[7] The most recent emphasis adopted by the Board revolves
around a worker’s entrepreneurial opportunity: “a principle by which to evaluate the overall effect of the
common-law factors on a putative contractor’s independence to pursue economic gain.” [8]
The case at hand involved airport transportation company, SuperShuttle, and franchisees who operated the
shared-ride vans.[9] Franchisees sought coverage under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which
excludes independent contractors from its provisions.[10] As statutory employees, franchisees would instead
be more protected by worker-friendly laws than in their current independent contractor status.[11] In its
decision, the Board gave the most weight to the franchisee’s ownership and control of their vans, their complete
control over work schedules, and the principle instrumentality of the work.[12] Ultimately, the Board reasoned
that the given factors provide franchisees with signi cant entrepreneurial opportunity and control over how
much money they make each month.[13]
The decision explicitly states that entrepreneurial opportunity is neither a “super-factor,” nor a “trump card,” the
explanation of which makes the opposite seem true.[14] Dissenting member McFerran argues that the
SuperShuttle drivers were, in fact, employees under any reasonable interpretation and application of the
common-law test.[15] Indeed, the focus on entrepreneurial opportunity imposes an ideologic stranglehold on
worker classi cation.[16]
In the past, parties have meticulously argued both in favor of[17] and against[18] an employer-employee
relationship in order to fall under or abstain from laws and doctrines such as worker’s compensation and
respondeat superior.[19] The ruling in this case appears to undermine the logic and rationales behind past
decisions in favor of a harsher approach meant to restrict any likelihood of unionizing ride-sharing companies
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in future litigation.[20] The result of this case imposes a pin-hole view on the categorical employee by tainting
the test with a super uous concept as a means to an end.
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